The ongoing rise of inequality and the outbreak of the economic crisis since 2008 have fueled the debate about the effects of macro-economic processes on democracy in general, and on political participation in particular. Whereas the effect of economic disparity is well documented in the literature, the implications of the economic downturn have not been sufficiently evaluated so far.
increases, the disparity in participation between the rich and the poor will widen. The first goal of this article is to test this hypothesis, which includes two distinct statements:
H1) Inequality depresses overall participation and increases the participatory gap between the rich and the poor.
Further empirical evidences of such patterns are reported, among others, by Lancee and Werfhortst (2012; see also Toth et al. 2014) and Karakoç (2013) . However, even though inequality is always found to depress participation, its differential effect on the rich and the poor (i.e. its asymmetrical impact) is challenged by further studies. On the one hand, Anderson and Beramendi (2008) show that inequality significantly lower participation at both ends of the income distribution, thus leaving the participatory gap unaltered (equal impact). On the other, Ansolabehere et al. (2003) find that inequality encourages engagement for rich individuals (their focus is on campaign contribution) and has an opposite effect at the other extreme of the income distribution (symmetrical impact).
This means we have good reasons to replicate the analyses on a range of outcomes, all the more so in order to test the predictive capability of Solt's model in times of economic turmoil. As a matter of fact, no studies among those mentioned above include data collected during the ongoing crisis, and it is thus important to check whether the relationship between inequality and participation still holds under these circumstances.
Crisis and participation
Our second aim is to assess whether the crisis itself has an impact on citizens' participation. So far this question attracted little attention. A notable exception is the study by Kern et al. (2015) who test the effects of indicators associated with the economic downturn (first and foremost unemployment rates) on changes to participation in Europe. Their main working hypothesis builds on the so-called grievance theory, which expects to see higher levels of political animosity and participation in response to rising poverty and unemployment. Since 2008, most of European countries faced enormous economic problems, in terms of economic contraction and rising unemployment rates. When citizens perceive their own situation as falling short of expectations and think they don't get what they deserve, feelings of relative deprivation arise and these, in turn, are expected to create a strong incentive for collective action and protest behavior (Gurr 1970 , Klandermans et al. 2008 . Their analysis provides support for this model and indeed it shows that rising unemployment levels encourage specific forms of non-institutionalized participation. Hence, our working hypothesis in this respect goes as follows:
H2) The economic crisis encourages political participation.
Notwithstanding its merit, their analysis can be improved. First of all, the authors do not control the effect of the crisis for other factors at the country-level. Their dataset includes both democratic and non-democratic countries (the Russian Federation) and no control for this and for different participation propensities in Eastern and Western Europe is included in their model. Furthermore, and most importantly, they do not control for additional economic factors, such as inequality or country-specific levels of wellbeing i . Our analysis does so, in order to isolate the actual impact of the economic crisis from that of other factors and to gain a more robust assessment of its consequences. Second, they principally focus on the main effect of the crisis and present no evidence for its contingent effect, i.e. the differential effect of the crisis depending on individual economic resources. As economic crises often have more dramatic effects on the poor (cf. Baldacci et al 2012), for instance because of cuts to welfare programs on which they disproportionately depend, they are likely to feel more deprived than other groups and may thus, following the logic of the grievance theory, be more inclined to become politically active than more privileged groups (cf.
Foster and Matheson 1995). This would lead one to surmise that the greater the economic downturn is, the smaller is the difference in political participation between the rich and the poor (or, even more spectacularly, the greater is this difference to the benefit of the poor):
H3) The economic crisis reduces the participatory gap between the rich and the poor.
Thus, while relative power theory expects lower levels of and greater social gaps in participation in the more unequal countries, grievance theory anticipates opposite outcomes with respect to the economic crisis, i.e. higher levels of and greater equality in participation in the more crisis-afflicted countries.
Data and variables

Data
As already mentioned, we focus on democratic European countries. All survey data are drawn from the European Social Survey (ESS), which is a biennial, high-quality survey of values, attitudes and behavior among European populations. More specifically, we create a pooled dataset using the first six rounds: this allows us to cover a period of time included between 2002 and 2012, with three rounds collected before the economic crisis (2002, 2004 and 2006) and three rounds completed after the beginning of the Great Recession (2008, 2010 and 2012 
Independent Variables
Three main independent variables are put under scrutiny, i.e. income at the individual level, income inequality and a measure of the economic crisis at the macro-level. Since we are firstly interested in the role of economic resources at the individual level, we focus on the role of the household's total net income. Some economists prefer consumption expenditures instead, since it is more smoothed over time and less volatile than income. However, as Brandolini and Smeeding (2011) discuss in more details, consumption is preferred in less developed countries, whereas income remains the prevalent indicator within rich countries, as it represents the possibility to consume and, as measured over a span of a year, a satisfactory measure of material standards of living. The first difficulty we had to face was the harmonization of the two income scales provided by the first three rounds and the last three rounds of the ESS, i.e. the 12-point fixed scale provided by ESS 1, 2 and 3, and the 10-point country-specific scale provided from ESS 4 on. In order to create a comparable measure for all rounds, we first identified the category with the median income earner for each country; then, we recoded all respondents with income above the median with 1, and the rest with 0.
Though providing a rough measure of within-country distribution of income, the dummy variable allows us to evaluate the impact of earning an income above the median on the propensity to participate.
At the country-year level, we take the Gini index of income inequality as our measure of economic inequality. Country-and year-specific values are obtained from the Standardized World
Income Inequality Database (SWIID) created by Solt (2016), which is the largest database available in this respect.
Measuring the economic crisis is less straightforward, given its multidimensional nature and the many components that one may associate to it. Whereas aforementioned studies address the effects of each dimension separately, we developed a synthetic measure of the Recession following Kriesi (2014) . This measure, which we labeled "Economic Crisis Index" (ECI), is based on the GDP growth rate in the year preceding the ESS fieldwork, the budget deficit/surplus in the year before the survey, and the unemployment rate of the same year. Similar to the Gini index it has countryand year-specific values. High values denote negative GDP growth, large budget deficits and high unemployment and thus reflect a severe economic crisis.
iii Further control variables are included in the models. First of all, we control for levels of economic prosperity (measured by GDP per capita), which is included as a county-year variable.
Several studies confirm that turnout tends to be higher in economically advanced societies ( Verba, 1963) and its relevance is confirmed over and over (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba et al. 1995; Blais 2000) . For reasons of parsimony, we regroup the existing categories provided by ESS into three different groups, i.e. those with 10 years of education or lower recoded as 1, those with 11 to 13 years of education recoded as 2, those with more than 14 years of education recoded as 3. By doing so, we create three categories that include approximately 33% of the population each. Classically, we expect education to have a positive influence on individual propensity to participate.
Age is the second most significant factor according to some studies (Blais 2000; 2007) , although its impact may be multifaceted. Whereas younger generations are generally supposed to be less interested in political engagement, recent studies suggest that they tend to vote less, but participate more through alternative channels, e.g. protest actions (Melo and Stockemer 2014).
Similarly, gender is expected to matter as well, since existing studies find marked differences between males and females in intended political participation (e. 
Empirical analysis
The impact of economic inequality
As previously mentioned, we work on a hierarchically structured dataset, with individuals (level-1) clustered in country-years (level-2), which are in turn clustered in countries (level-3). We also expect political engagement to be shaped both by predictors at the individual level and at the country-year level and by interactions between these variables. We therefore estimate a series of Multilevel Models (MlM). MLM is appropriate when data are nested, whereas using OLS regression on nested data -by means of disaggregating level-2 variables at level-1 -would overestimate the effect of macro-level factors (Snijders and Bosker 1999, Hox 2002) . We estimate a three-level model (of countries, country-years and individuals) rather than a two level one (of country-years and individuals) to correct for the bias produced by the non-independence of observations concerning years within countries (the same strategy was adopted by Solt in his articles and by a number of studies that rely on repeated observations over time; see also Koster and Kaminska 2011). Since our dependent variables are binary coded, we estimate Binomial Multilevel Models with random effects. The table below reports the coefficients for two models for each form of participation: in the first (Model 1), we test the main effects; in the second (Model 2), we introduce the interactions of Gini and ECI with individual income. As each of these models includes both Gini and ECI, these factors effectively control for one another.
iv (Table 1 about Because of this we take a closer look at the interactions by plotting the interaction terms. In the plots below we show how the effect of income on participation varies across different levels of inequality. The greater this effect, the larger the gap between the rich and the poor. The plots thus allow us to directly address the statement about the participation gap in Hypothesis 1. We follow the same strategy for assessing the interaction between economic crisis and income (see Figures 5-8 further down), thus allowing us to engage with Hypothesis 3.
( Figures 1-4 about here)
As the Figure 1 shows, the effect of income barely changes under different levels of economic inequality in the case of voting. If anything, the Gini index contributes to enlarge the participatory gap between rich and poor (i.e. the slope is slightly positive), but the effect is not significant and too weak to be taken into account. Nevertheless, the other graphs tell a radically different story: on the one hand, our expectations are not confirmed by the second interaction, as the divide between the rich and the poor significantly decreases alongside rising inequality in the case of working in organizations. On the other hand, the disparity-exacerbating effect of inequality is confirmed by the other two forms of participation: income inequality widens the gap between the rich and the poor for boycotting products and signing a petition. In case of the latter, income does not make a difference in the most equal countries but becomes a positive predictor of signing a petition as inequality increases. All in all, Solt's findings and our first working hypothesis (H1) are partially confirmed: economic inequality tends to depress overall levels of participation and enhances the gap between the rich and the poor on some alternative forms of political participation.
The impact of the economic crisis
The two models address the second issue of the article as well, i.e. testing the main and conditional effect of the economic crisis. Following Kern et al. (2015) , we control this effect for a number of factors, including the main and contingent effects of income inequality. As compared to the previous section, one thing seems clear: the economic crisis does not appear to have much of an effect on overall participation as its effect is not significant in three out of four cases (see Model 1).
Rather than fueling or depressing citizens' engagement, the economic crisis seems to have no consequences at all at first sight, with the notable exception of voting which is significantly reduced by economic downturn. This disconfirms Hypothesis 2 which expected the economic crisis to enhance participation.
light of the aforementioned clarification by Brambor and colleagues (2006) . Similar to the previous section, we plot the interaction terms in order to evaluate whether the effect of income varies under different economic performances.
( Figures 5 -8) Again, the act of voting seems to be the most immune to contextual influences: the participatory gap determined by household income remains stable, no matter if measured in countries hit by the crisis (on the right of the figure) or in countries with high-performing economies. On the contrary, the same analysis on other forms of participation highlights more variation: once controlled for all other economic factors, the effect of income on the propensity to be part of an organization drops as the economic crisis becomes more severe. Even more interestingly, the effect of income on the propensity of boycotting products is apparently not significant when the economy fares well -or barely significant in the case of signing petitions. In both cases, the effect becomes more evidently significant and negative under poor performances. This means that the worse-off are comparatively more active than the rich when the crisis hits hard, which is coherent with expectations based on the grievance theory discussed above.
The impact of the control variables
In terms of the control variables, economic prosperity, the other variable measured at the yearcountry level, has little influence on participation, which is consistent with Blais' argument (2007) that no significant difference exists among countries with relatively little variation in affluence. If 
Summary and discussion
To say it with Lijphart (1997), if democracy is at its core associated with the ideal of political equality, how does it cope with a reality of unequal participation which, in turn, is likely to lead to an unequal influence over the outcome of the democratic decision-making process? To be sure, the concept of political equality is complicated and discussing it is well beyond the scope of this article.
Measuring political inequality entails different and complementary strategies, broadly distinguished between those that focus on the input side and those focusing on the output side (Dubrow 2014). In other words, inequality can be assessed either in terms of unequal political input of certain groups in the decision-making process, or in terms of the differential effects of political decisions on different social groups. Focusing on citizens' participation clearly belongs to the former strategy and it moves from the idea that even if the choice of non-participation at the individual level is perfectly compatible with the framework of liberal democracy, recurring statistical patterns raise an issue of underrepresentation of certain groups' interests. As Offe puts it, the problem arises when patterns of uneven under-utilization of political resources exist: "here non-participation is evidently not freely chosen, or it is freely chosen as the conditions that are statistically correlated with this choice are themselves not freely chosen, but conditional on circumstances that are beyond the control of those affected by them" (2013, 203) . In view of this observation, the current article examined whether within-country distribution of participation varies under different macro-economic circumstances.
Our analysis offers a twofold contribution to the literature. On the one hand, it tests existing findings on the impact of economic disparities. More specifically, Solt's comprehensive studies on the role of income inequality (2008, 2010, 2015) are replicated on European data and his findings are by and large confirmed, even if tested in times of economic turmoil. Income inequality generally reduces overall participation -though its effect is not statistically significant on all forms of participation -and, most importantly, increases the gap between better-and worse-off in three forms of participation out of four (minimally for voting and significantly for signing petitions and boycotting products). Interestingly enough, inequality mitigates the income gap in the case of working in organizations. This is because inequality has depressed overall levels of this form of participation to such an extent that there is relatively little variation in this outcome in the most unequal countries, and apparently too little for income to have an effect. vii Why there is so little variation in working in organizations in more unequal countries is a question for further research.
On the other hand, the analysis shows that the crisis has no major effect on the propensity to engage, but it does influence the within-country distribution of active citizens. In the case of voting and working in organizations, the income-based divide is mitigated by the crisis; in the case of boycotting products and signing petitions the worse-off are relatively more active than the rich in countries having suffered most from the crisis.
These findings have some theoretical implications as well. Whereas the relative power theory confirms its predictive capability concerning the effects of economic disparities, the grievance model has good explanatory power regarding the effect of economic crises on the political participation of different income groups. This is particularly true for alternative forms of participation. Findings by Kern et al. (2015) are thus confirmed, even if controlled for all factors that were not included in the previous studies. Similar to their study, our results suggest that both theoretical approaches presented in this article (i.e. the relative power theory and the grievance theory) can help to assess participatory tendencies, especially if these are tested in times of economic turmoil.
Why do income inequality and the economic crisis have such contrasting effects on the link between income and political participation and thereby confirm such conflicting theories? We can only speculate about the reasons here. Possibly the diverging effects have to do with the different pace at which the two macro-economic processes operate. While inequality is changing slowly and is taking decades to become notably larger or smaller, an economic crisis can occur suddenly and upset seemingly healthy growth trajectories (as happened in Greece). Perhaps the relative inertia of inequality gives rise to a sentiment that not much can be done about it, which in turn might fuel political disengagement and alienation amongst the poor. In contrast, the immediacy of an economic crisis and the acute sense of loss experienced by those most affected by it might incite people to act in an effort to regain what was lost (as illustrated by the mass demonstrations in
Greece in the aftermath of the crisis). In other words, while inequality might undermine a sense of external political efficacy, economic crises could well enhance it. This is a question for future research to explore. i Taking into consideration only the GDP per capita annual growth (%) without controlling it for the overall level of wellbeing (e.g. GDP per capita itself) overestimates the economic conditions of some fast developing countries (e.g. Estonia) as compared to rich ones (e.g. (e.g. Finland).
ii Differently from Kern et al. (2015) , we exclude those countries that are rated either as not free or partly free by Freedom House, i.e. Albania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine and Kosovo. The reason for this is that participating to political affairs may acquire a totally different meaning in full democracies and in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, we must exclude from the analysis all those countries where the ESS question on income is not included (Bulgaria 2008 , Estonia 2004 and 2006 , Cyprus 2006 and 2008 , Hungary 2002 and 2006 , France 2002 , Ireland 2002 , Portugal 2010 and Slovakia 2008 .
iii Economic Crisis Index = GDP Growth -Unemployment + Deficit-Surplus. For the sake of clarity, we then reverse the scale, so that higher scores correspond to more severe economic hardship. We created the measure by first standardising the three variables that it includes and then by subtracting gdp growth from the sum of budget deficit and unemployment rate.
iv Although we have not found any theoretical leads in the literature to suggest that austerity might influence whether income inequality enhances or mitigates the participation gap between the rich and poor, we nonetheless checked for this possibility by running a model with a three-way interaction between economic crisis, income inequality and individual income and a two-way interaction between economic crisis and income inequality. The effects of these interactions turned out to be insignificant (results can be obtained from the authors upon request). Hence we only report the results of the more parsimonious models (i.e. Models 1 and 2).
v We are referring here to the predicted probabilities computed on the basis of the regression coefficients. In Binomial Multilevel Models, the coefficient β associated to each Xn is the effect of a unit increment of X on the logit scale (i.e. log-odds, or the natural logarithm of the odds determining the probability of a certain outcome Y associated to X). vi Three meaningful categories are built on the basis of the years of full-time education completed in order to include approximately 30% of the respondents in each.
vii A table showing the variation in the four outcomes across different levels of inequality and economic crisis can be obtained from the authors upon request.
